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STUDENT ESSAY
INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED:
THE BAZE PLURALITY PAINFULLY "EXECUTED"
THE PURPOSE OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Michelle Lynn Veronica Consiglio]
I.

Introduction

On April 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of lethal injection as a
method of execution. In its analysis, the Court recognized,
as it had in prior cases, that the government's choice of a
particular method of execution did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. As a
result, the Court upheld the constitutionality of lethal
injection in Baze3 v. Rees, 2 rendering a seven-to-two
plurality decision.
1 J.D., pending May 2011, Univ. of Tennessee; B.A., International
Relations, Boston Univ., summa cum laude. Prior to attending law
school, Ms. Consiglio worked at the Tennessee Legislature during the
105th General Assembly as the Research Analyst for the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
2 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
3 Id. at 1521 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts authored the plurality
opinion with Justices Kennedy and Alito joining). Justice Alito also
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1538. Justice Stevens filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1542. Justice Scalia filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Thomas joined. Id.
at 1552. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
which Justice Scaliajoined. Id. at 1556. Justice Breyer filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1563. Justice Ginsberg filed a
dissenting opinion, which Justice Souter joined. Id. at 1567; see also
Harbison v. Little, No 07-6225, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14742, at *8
(6th Cir. July 2, 2009) ("The Court issued several opinions in that case,
including Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion (writing for two

1
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Because no single rationale explaining the result
gained the assent of five justices, "the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.
..., In other words, because the plurality opinion does
not act as authority, no controlling principle or justification
for the ultimate decision emerged from the case.
Nonetheless, because the rationale behind the decision was
a point of contention among the justices, it warrants
exploration here. Lastly, issues surrounding the death
penalty have been analyzed and debated for centuries;
however, an important distinction must be noted between
the general death penalty debate and the instant matter: the
issue presented in Baze concerned the execution method of
lethal injection and not the controversial issue of the
existence of the death penalty itself.5
In Baze, the Court addressed the issue of whether
lethal injection as a method of execution is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishments." 6 According to the two Petitioners, Ralph
Baze and Thomas Bowling, a chance existed that the
method's protocol might not be followed or administered
resulting in the infliction of pain during their
correctly, thus
7
executions.
other justices), one concurring opinion, four other opinions concurring
Under those
in the judgment, and one dissenting opinion.
circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion is
controlling.") (citations omitted).
4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
5 See Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1542 (Alito,J., concurring).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VHI.
7 Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1526. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky's decision on the
issue, stating the constitutionality of the method of lethal injection.
Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006). The only issue decided by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky was the manner in which the
Commonwealth of Kentucky can carry out the death sentences on all

2
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The Baze decision is currently important and
relevant because thirty-six jurisdictions (thirty-five states
and the Federal Government) have adopted lethal injection
as their primary or exclusive means of carrying out a
sentence of death. Accordingly, lethal injection is "by far
the most prevalent method of execution in the United
States." 8 Further, thirty of the thirty-six jurisdictions that
use lethal injection, including Kentucky (where Baze
originated) and the Federal Government, employ a threedrug protocol. 9
In Baze, the Court analyzed the
convicts. Id. at 209. The convicts argued that the lethal injection
method was cruel and unusual punishment, making it unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 17
of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. The Court explained that "[p]rior
interpretation of Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that
a method of punishment is cruel and unusual if it shocks the moral
sense of reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the
circumstances." Id. at 210 (citations omitted). After analyzing the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and examining the history of
executions in Kentucky, the Court stated that "[t]he prohibition [of the
Eighth Amendment and Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution] is
against cruel punishment and does not require a complete absence of
pain." Id. at 212 (emphasis added). The Court ultimately held that
"[t]he lethal injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 17 of
the Kentucky Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
8 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1526-27, 1527 n.1 (citing statutes from the
twenty-seven of thirty-six states that require the use of lethal injection
as the sole method of execution) (citations omitted).
9 Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). The three drugs used in the protocol are sodium thiopental,
pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride, administered in that
order. Id. (citation omitted).
The dose of sodium thiopental, a barbiturate that
"reduced oxygen flow to the brain and causes
respiratory depression" . . . quickly anesthetizes the
inmate and is sufficient to cause death in the absence
of the two additional chemicals in the protocol.
Pancuronium bromide is a "muscle paralytic" that

3
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constitutionality of lethal injection in the context of this
particular methodl ° and held that Kentucky's execution
method satisfied the Eighth Amendment."'
The Court's grant of certiorari in this case garnered
national attention and subsequently brought about an
unofficial national moratorium on executions pending the
Court's consideration of the Eighth Amendment issue.12
Therefore, in analyzing the constitutionality of lethal
injection, the Court sought to provide clarity and to
"assist[s]

in the suppression of breathing and
ensure[s] death." The amount of pancuronium
bromide that the State administers also proves fatal
on its own, and the State selected the drug because it
hastens death, and "prevents involuntary muscular
movement that may interfere with the proper
thus
equipment,"
the
IV
to
functioning
"contribut[ing] to the dignity of the death process."
Potassium chloride, a salt, interferes with heart
function, causing "cardiac arrest and rapid death." If
administered properly, the sodium thiopental
anesthetizes inmates before they receive the
remaining two drugs.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
10

Originally, the dosage was "2 grams of sodium thiopental, 50

milligrams of pancuronium bromide, and 240 milliequivalents of
potassium chloride." Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528. Now, Kentucky's
protocol consists of 3 grams of sodium thiopental, 50 milligrams of
pancuronium bromide, and 240 milliequivalents of potassium chloride.
Id. (citation omitted).
I Id. at 1538.
12 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at Al ("Dozens of executions have
The Supreme
been delayed around the country in recent months ....
Court itself had not imposed a general moratorium, instead granting
individual stays of execution in cases that reached the court."); Adam
Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2007, at A32 ("The Supreme Court now appears to have once
again imposed a moratorium on executions as it considers how to
assess the constitutionality of lethal injections.").

4
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establish a workable standard for the lower courts to apply
to the influx of litigation challenging lethal injection.
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts
distinguished the petitioners' claim of an "unnecessary4
risk" standard' 3 from the stated "substantial risk" standard1
as the standard that must be met in order for an execution
method to violate the Eighth Amendment. Time and time
again, the Court had opportunities to rule on the
15
constitutionality of a state's chosen method of execution.
Each time, however, the Court refused to take what would
have amounted to an unprecedented step because the
justices did not perceive such a determination to be 6within
the purview of the Court's role in the justice system.'
The Baze plurality determined that Kentucky's
lethal injection protocol not only conformed with Eighth
Amendment requirements but also recognized that the
"substantial risk" standard acted as an acknowledged
13 See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1529.

[Petitioners] contend that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits procedures that create an "unnecessary risk"
of pain. Specifically they argue that courts must
evaluate "(a) the severity of pain risked, (b) the
likelihood of that pain occurring, and (c) the extent to
which alternative means are feasible, either by
modifying existing execution procedures or adopting
alternative procedures."
Id. (citations omitted).
14 id. at 1531 ("We have explained that to prevail on such a claim there
must be a 'substantial risk of serious harm'....") (citations omitted).
"5 Id. at 1530 ("This Court has never invalidated a State's chosen
procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment."). In support of this contention, the Court
discussed its previous decisions on the matter. See id. Such cases will
be described in detail later in the Case Note.
16 Id. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We have neither the authority
nor the expertise to micromanage the States' administration of the
death penalty in this manner.").

5
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limitation on the Court's ability to dictate execution
methods to the states. Nevertheless, it can be argued that
the substantial risk standard that the Court established in
this case is not the governing Eighth Amendment standard.
Instead, as set out in previous majority opinion cases, the
test is much more direct: A method of execution violates
the Eighth Amendment if it intentionally inflicts or
enhances pain. This note will show that although the Baze
plurality was correct in its ultimate judgment, the plurality
opinion complicated the underlying intent of the Eighth
Amendment by asserting a questionable and historically
unsupported risk-based standard as the test of determining
the constitutionality of a method of execution.
II.

Case Summary of Baze v. Rees

Baze arose in Kentucky after two death row
inmates, Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, "completely
exhausted all of the legitimate state and federal means for
challenging their convictions and the propriety of [their]
death sentences." 17 Baze was convicted by a jury on two
counts of murder for shooting two law enforcement officers
with an assault rifle as the officers attempted to serve him
with five felony fugitive warrants. 18 Bowling was likewise
convicted by a jury on two counts of murder for killing a
as they sat in their automobile outside a
husband and wife 19
store.
dry cleaning
The convicted felons first filed suit in the Franklin
County Circuit Court in Kentucky, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the lethal injection method of execution
violated their state and federal constitutional rights because

Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 209.
18Id. (citing Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997)).
17

19 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 209 (citing Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873

S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1997)).

6
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such a method was cruel and unusual punishment. 20 After
a thorough bench trial, consisting of seventeen depositions
and twenty witnesses, the Circuit Court denied relief, after
which the defendants appealed to the Kentucky Supreme
Court. 2 1 After "careful review of this matter," that tribunal
determined that there was "no reason to believe that the
circuit judge was clearly erroneous in any of his findings of
fact," ruling, "the decision of the trial judge was not clearly
erroneous nor was there any abuse of discretion." 22 The
court stated that "[a] method of execution is considered to
be cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal
Constitution when the procedure for execution creates a
substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain, torture, or lingering death."2 3 Using that standard,
and after a detailed examination of lethal injection as a
method of execution, the court held that "[t]he lethal
injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or

20

Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 209 (citing Woods v. Commonwealth, 142

S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004)).
21
Id. The Supreme Court of Kentucky briefly summarized the
conclusions of the trial judge: 1) the inmates did not show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the lethal injection method was not
normal in capital punishment; 2) the method was not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to degrade the dignity of the felons; 3)
no evidence proved that lethal injection inflicted unnecessary pain and
suffering; 4) no evidence supported the contention that lethal injection
caused unnecessary psychological suffering; 5) the method does not
deprive the prisoners of their due process rights; and 6) the actual
physical administration of the method did not create a substantial risk
of unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering to violate the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 210-11 (citations omitted).
22 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 210.
23 Id. at 209 (emphasis added) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153

(1976)).

7
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Constitution's ban on cruel and
Section 17 of the Kentucky
24
punishment."
unusual
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision.25
The Court first confirmed that "capital punishment is
constitutional" 26 and pointed out that there must be some
means of carrying out such punishment. 27 Further, the
Court agreed that "the Constitution does not demand the
28
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions,
and, likewise, the petitioners did not claim that all pain
must be avoided. 29 Rather, the petitioners contended that
"the Eighth Amendment prohibits procedures that create an
'unnecessary risk' of pain." 30 The petitioners argued that
the courts must consider "(a) the severity of pain risked, (b)
the likelihood of that pain occurring, and (c) the extent to
which alternative means are feasible, either by modifying
existing execution procedures or adopting alternative
procedures."31
The Court, however, rejected this contention and
explained that the petitioners failed to meet their "heavy
burden," 32 stating that "to prevail on such a claim there
must be a 'substantial risk of serious harm,' an 'objectively
intolerable risk of harm' [by the current procedure] ....
Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 212. "Baze and Bowling have not met their
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence as necessary in a
declaratory judgment action. The findings of fact by the trial judge are
not clearly erroneous. The conclusions of law are correct." Id. at 21213.
24

27

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1529 (citation omitted).
Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177).
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1529.

28

id.

25
26

id.
30 id.
29

31 Id. (citation omitted).
32 Baze v. Rees, at 1533 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175).

33 Baze v. Rees, at 1531 (citation omitted).

8
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Accordingly, the Court asserted that "a condemned prisoner
cannot successfully challenge a State's method of
execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer
alternative." 34 To be successful, a challenger must not only
prove that "the State's lethal injection protocol creates a
demonstrated risk of severe pain [but must also] show that
the risk is substantial 35when compared to the known and
available alternatives."
The petitioners argued that the actual protocol for
administering the three-drug combination could create
opportunities for error, which was a claim that relied on the
improper administration of the first drug, sodium
thiopental.36 The Court, however, found that the petitioners
did not prove that the risk of administering an inadequate
dose was a substantial risk of serious harm. 37 The Court
34 id.

35 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1537 (emphasis added).
36

Id. at 1533.

Petitioners contend that there is a risk of improper
administration of thiopental because the doses are
difficult to mix into solution form and load into
syringes; because the protocol fails to establish a rate
of injection, which could lead to a failure of the IV;
because it is possible that the IV catheters will
infiltrate into surrounding tissue, causing an
inadequate dose to be delivered to the vein; because

of inadequate facilities and training; and because
Kentucky has no reliable means of monitoring the
anesthetic depth of the prisoner after the sodium
thiopental has been administered.
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 12-20, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520
(2008)).
37 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1533.

We cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous,
particularly when that finding is substantiated by
expert testimony describing the task of reconstituting

9
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also established that "Kentucky's failure to adopt
Petitioners' proposed alternatives" did not "demonstrate
that the Commonwealth's execution procedure [was] cruel
This view rejected the petitioners'
and unusual., 38
contention that Kentucky could switch to a one-drug
protocol "by using a single dose of sodium thiopental or
other barbiturate." 39 The Court concluded that "the
Commonwealth's continued use of the three-drug protocol
cannot be viewed as posing an 'objectively intolerable risk'
when no other State has adopted the one-drug method and
petitioners proffered no study showing that it is an equally
effective manner of imposing a death sentence. 4 °
In summation, the holding of the Court indicated
that the Eighth Amendment sets a rigorous requirement,
even when using a risk-based standard: "Simply because
an execution method may result in pain, either by accident
or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not
establish the sort of 'objectively intolerable risk of harm'
that qualifies as cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment. 4 '
powder sodium thiopental into solution form as
"[n]ot difficult at all... You take a liquid, you inject
it into a vial with the powder, then you shake it
up until the powder dissolves and, you're done. The
insert."
package
the
on
are
instructions
to
the IV
related
problems
the
asserted
Likewise,
lines do not establish a sufficiently substantial risk of
harm to meet the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. Kentucky has put in place several
important safeguards to ensure that an adequate dose
of sodium thiopental is delivered to the condemned
prisoner.
Id. (citations omitted).
38 Id. at 1534.
39 Id. (citation omitted).
40 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1535 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 1531 (emphasis added).

10
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III.

Development of the Law

The United States Supreme Court considered
challenges to the methods and circumstances of
Each time the Court
implementation of executions.
rejected the challenge, holding that either the method of
execution or circumstances surrounding its imposition did
As in Baze, the
not violate the Eighth Amendment.
constitutionality of the death penalty itself was not at issue
in any of the preceding cases. Rather, the Court focused on
the constitutionality of specific methods and circumstances
42
surrounding the implementation of capital sentences.
Before proceeding, recall that the "cruel and unusual
punishments" provision for the Eighth Amendment was not
"incorporated" in the Fourteenth Amendment and thus
applied to the States until 1962. 4 3 Therefore, prior to that
time, all Supreme Court cases arising from the States
focused on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in assessing cruelty, and not on the Eighth
Amendment's provision.
First, in Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court addressed
whether the Federal Territory of Utah's method of death by
firing squad violated the Eighth Amendment.4 4 A jury
convicted the prisoner of first-degree murder, and he was
sentenced to death.4 5 At the time, Congress provided that
42

43

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that a

California statute making it a criminal offense to be addicted to the use

of narcotics constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution).
44
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). Also, for historical
reference, the Supreme Court was referring to the Federal Territory of
Utah and not the current State of Utah. Id. Utah was not admitted to
the Union until 1896; therefore, no issue of incorporation of the Eighth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment appears in Wilkerson. Id.
41 Id. at 132.

11
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"[d]uly organized Territories are invested with legislative
power, which extends to all rightful subjects of legislation
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
Further, "Congress organized the
United States.' ' 4 6
Territory of Utah on the 9th of September, 1850, and
provided that the legislative power and authority of the
Territory shall be vested in the governor and legislative
assembly., 47 In accordance with Congress's grant of
power to the territories, the Complied Laws of the Territory
of Utah stated that "'when any person shall be convicted of
any crime the punishment of which is death . . . he shall
suffer death by being shot, hung, or beheaded, as the court
may direct,' or as the convicted person may chose.",48 The
Court recognized that the laws of the Territories must not
violate the Constitution, analyzing the comments of several
prominent authors on the meaning and application of cruel
and unusual punishment. 49 After such consideration, the
Court concluded that it would be difficult to "define with
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture
... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty
are forbidden by [the Eighth Amendment] to the
Describing its understanding of the
Constitution.
meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" as instances
where pain was "superadded, '' 5 1 the Court referenced cases
"where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of
execution; or where he was emboweled alive, beheaded,
,52 In light of its statements, the Court
and quartered ...
46
47
48
49

Id. at 130 (citing Rev. Stats., sect. 1851).
Id. (citing 9 Stat. 454).
Id. (quoting 1852 Utah Laws 61; 1856 Utah Laws 564)).
See generally Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134-37.
50 Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 135.
52 Id.

12
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did not conclude that death by firing squad was
"unnecessary cruelty, ' 53 rather it held that Territory of
execution did not inflict cruel and
Utah's method of 54
punishment.
unusual
Second, in In re Kemmler,55 the Court, without
hesitation, refused to declare New York's execution
method of electrocution unconstitutional.56 The petitioner
challenged the execution method on Fourteenth
Amendment due process grounds, meaning that the Court
did not specifically reach the issue of Eighth Amendment
interpretation. 57 Instead, in light of Wilkerson, the Court
simply examined the meaning of "cruel" in the Eighth
Amendment, stating that "[p]unishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of the
word used in the Constitution. It implies there is something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.",58
Because such extreme
punishments would be cruel and this distinction was
"common knowledge," 59 the Court did not assume that
electrocution was "cruel" in this instance because "it was
in what manner
for the legislature to say,,60d
e e a msentence
n d t a tof
h
death should be executed.
The Court determined that the
decision to use electrocution as its means of execution did
not violate "any title, right, privilege, or immunity specially
set up or claimed by the petitioner under the Constitution of
Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136 ("Concede all that, and still it by no means
follows that the sentence of the court in this case falls within that
category, or that the Supreme Court of the Territory erred in affirming
the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction.")
53
54

55 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
56

Id. at 449.

51 Id. at 446.
58

Id. at 447 (emphasis added).

59 id.
60 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.

13
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the United States." 6 1 Therefore, the decision as to which
method should be used "was almost wholly confided" 62 in
the legislature of the State. The Court further clarified the
role of the judiciary in determining the constitutionality of
an execution method by stating that "if the punishment
prescribed . . . were manifestly cruel and unusual, as
burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or
the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such
63
penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition."
Such was not the case in Kemmiler, and the Court rejected
the Fourteenth Amendment challenge to electrocution
because "the legislature of the State of New York
determined that [electrocution] did not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment, and its courts have sustained that
determination." 64 Therefore, the Court could not "perceive
that the State has thereby abridged the privileges or
the petitioner, or deprived him of due
immunities of 65
law."
of
process
Lastly and in a different context (circumstances of
the actual implementation of the death penalty) in
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,66 a plurality of the
Court refused to find that a second attempt at electrocution
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "on the ground that an execution under the
circumstances detailed would deny due process to [the
petitioner] because of... the cruel and unusual punishment
The Court
provision of the Eighth Amendment." 67
was an
first
attempt
reasoned, however, that because the

61

62
63

Id.
Id. at 446.
Id. (emphasis added).

64 Id. at 449.
65
66
67

Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449.
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
Id. at 461.

14
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"unforeseeable accident" 68 and a second attempt would not
"add an element of cruelty." 69 The initial attempt failed
because "[t]he executioner threw the switch but,
presumably because of some mechanical difficulty, death
did not result." 70 Although it was not the holding of the
case, the plurality explained its interpretation of the
intention of the Eighth Amendment in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause: "[t]he cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.",7' The plurality used such an
interpretation to support its decision that the second attempt
at the execution did not violate the petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights because of cruelty because
"no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain" existed.72
Although Wilkerson and Kemmler represent
precedent-setting cases that distinctively addressed the
constitutionality of specific methods of execution, it must
be noted that by no means are those cases the only Supreme
Court cases addressing the issue of the death penalty. A
plethora of cases have been argued before the Court
regarding the different aspects of the death penalty and its
interplay with the Eighth Amendment. For example,
although not dealing with specific methods of execution,
the Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,73 discussed the meaning of
"cruel and unusual" as an evolving concept, warranting
interpretation in "a flexible and dynamic manner.",74 The
Court rendered the Gregg decision when the tide of public
Id. at 464.
id.
70 Id. at 460.
71 Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 464-65 (emphasis added).
73 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
74 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
68

69

15
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opinion seemed to be shifting back in support of the death
penalty, following an unofficial moratorium on the death
During the nine-year
penalty from 1967-1976. 7 5
moratorium, the courts and much of society grappled with
the question of whether "the U.S. reached the point at
which the death penalty affronts the basic standards of
decency of contemporary society. ' ' 76 Although the ultimate
answer to that question was "No," the debate and its
resulting court decisions had a broad impact on the nation.
As evidence of the effect of that debate, the Court
issued an opinion during the moratorium years that
continues to be considered by many, especially by antideath penalty activists, as the landmark decision on the
issue: Furman v. Georgia.7 7 The Court held that the
imposition and implementation of the death penalty in
cases where it is used in a discriminatory manner upon
cruel and unusual
racial minorities "constitute[s]
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
75 See The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney,

Capital
Punishment Timeline, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htmi/death/
timeline.htm (last visited January 17, 2010) ("1966: Support for the
death penalty reaches an all time low. Gallup Poll shows nationwide
death penalty support only at 42%."); Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (showing a
42% approval rating in 1966 by poll participants to the following

question: "Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted
of murder?"); see also The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting
Attorney, CapitalPunishment Timeline, http://www.clarkprosecutor.
org/html/death/timeline.htm (last visited January 17, 2010) ("1967:

After Luis Jose Monge is executed in the gas chamber at Colorado
State Penitentiary, an unofficial moratorium on executions begins.").
Luis Jose Monge was convicted for the 1963 first-degree murders of his
wife and three of his ten children. He was the seventy-seventh person
to be executed in Colorado. THE NATION: Colorado:No. 77, TIME,
June 9, 1967 at 33.
76 Jose M. Ferrer, III, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual?, TIME,
Jan. 24, 1972 at 54.
77Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

16
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,,78

Amendments.
The Furman decision itself was a oneparagraph statement that invalidated the death penalty as it
was to be administered on the three petitioners. 79 Despite
this Eighth Amendment ruling, no uniform and decisive
argument emerged from the decision because each of the
five justices in the majority wrote his own concurring
opinion, with no justice joining any other concurring
opinion. 8° Also, no uniform standard was established
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-240 (Prisoners successfully challenged the
imposition of the death penalty because the punishment had been
applied in Georgia in an overly discretionary and discriminatory
manner).
78

79

Id.
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in
Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.
Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to
July 1, 1969). . . . Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was
convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to
death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp.
1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969) ....
Petitioner
in No. 69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and
was sentenced to death pursuant to Tex. Penal Code,
art. 1189 (1961). Certiorariwas granted limited to
the following question: "Does the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases]
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?" [. .]
The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each
case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves
undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the
cases are remandedforfurtherproceedings.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
80

Id.; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:

Reflecting on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362 (1995).
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because two of the five justices in the majority favored
outright invalidation of the death penalty 8 1 and the other
three left the door open on the issue.8 2 Further, each of the
four dissenting justices wrote his own dissenting opinion,
although unlike the justices in the majority, some of the
83
dissenting justices joined the opinions of other dissenters.
As a result, despite the length of the Furman
decision (the longest decision ever to appear in the U.S.
REPORTS), lower courts have not been able to identify the
precedent Furman intended to advance and ultimately have
not used the opinion to deem the death penalty
unconstitutional. 84 Nonetheless, Furman did have a broad
impact on the country: "[t]he practical effect of the
decision was to strike down existing statutes in all states,
and removing approximately 629 inmates from death row
[. .. ] 35 states responded immediately by enacting new
death penalty statutes, providing either for a mandatory
85
death sentence, or carefully guided jury discretion."
Although officials reconsidered and restructured death
penalty laws on both national and state levels in order to
accommodate the concerns stated in Furman,86 the
amended statutes that emerged did not lighten the amount
of death penalty litigation. Because problems arose with
81 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305-06 (Justice Brennan's concurrence and

reasoning for invalidation of the death penalty); Id. at 371 (Justice
Marshall's concurrence and opposition to the implementation of the
death penalty).
82 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Justice Douglas's concurrence); Id. at 310
(Justice Stewart's concurrence); Id. at 314 (Justice White's
concurrence).
83 See generally Furman, 408 U.S. at 375-470 (exhibiting all the
dissenting opinions).
84 Steiker, supra note 73, at 362.
85
The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, Capital
Punishment Timeline, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/
timeline.htm (last visited January 17, 2010).
86 Steiker, supra note 73, at 363 (citation omitted).
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the wording in a number of the new statutes, litigation
ensued to determine whether the new87 statutory
constructions should be upheld or struck down.
Although the litigation leading up to and including
Furman demonstrated changing times and a temporary
surge toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,
the pendulum started to move the other way in Gregg.
Chief Justice Warren expanded upon the notion that
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should be fluid by
stating in a pre-Furman case that "[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."8 8 In Gregg,
the Court agreed generally, stating that "an assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a
challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the
Eighth Amendment." 8 9 However, the Court continued and
ultimately stated that the power to determine these
"evolving standards of decency" 90 is limited because "in a
democratic society, legislatures, not courts, are constituted

87

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)

(challenging the

imposition of the death penalty under the amended, post-Furman laws
of Georgia, but ending with the Court upholding Georgia's statutes);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331, 336 (1976) (striking down a
statute that allowed for a mandatory death penalty in various
situations); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (also
striking down a mandatory death penalty statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276-77 (1976) (upholding a statute that provided sentencer
discretion through the use of "special issues"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (upholding a statute that guided sentencer
discretion through the use of mitigating factors.).
88 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (highlighting the general
notion that the Constitution is a living document, although Trop is not a
death penalty case).
89 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
90 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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to respond to9 the will and consequently the moral values of
the people." '
Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a
democratically elected legislature against the
constitutional measure, we presume its validity.
We may not require the legislature to select the
least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty
selected
is
not
cruelly
inhumane
or
disproportionate to the crime involved. And a
heavy burden rests on those who would attack92 the
judgment of the representatives of the people.
As evidenced above, the Court has varied on the
extent to which it will review the punishment selected by
the States in cases that do not deal directly with specific
methods of execution. However, when indeed faced with
determining the constitutionality of specific methods of
execution, as it was charged to do in Baze, the Court has
historically confined its powers and arguably
remained
93
within established bounds of judicial review.
IV.

Current Policy

History supports a conclusion that methods of
execution
and
circumstances
surrounding
the
implementation of execution have been challenged for
94
centuries; with each challenge, a precedent was set.
91 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (1972)

(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
92 Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
93 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
94 Wilkerson upheld death by firing squad as a constitutional method of
execution. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37. See also Kemmler, 136 U.S.

at 449 (upholding electrocution as a constitutional method of
execution); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (upholding the constitutionality
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Likewise, Baze set a standard, albeit in a plurality opinion,
for a judicial challenge of the method of lethal injection,
undoubtedly affecting current policy on the subject.
Oklahoma, in 1977, was the first state to adopt lethal
injection, 95 but the United States Supreme Court did not
directly address the method in light of the Eighth
Amendment until Baze. Numerous states voluntarily issued
moratoriums on executions by lethal injection while the
Supreme Court considered Baze. Several states juickly
resumed executions after the release of the decision. 9
Since Baze and as of June 1, 2009, sixty-six
convicted felons have been executed by lethal injection in
the United States. 97 Such executions went forward because

under the Eighth Amendment of a second attempt of death by

electrocution).

95 See The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, Methods of

http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/methods.htm
Execution,
(last visited July 20, 2009) ("In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state
to adopt lethal injection.").
96 See Bill Mears, Inmates in Two States Have Dates with Executioner,
CNN, May 2, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/05/02/
and
Georgia plan
("Mississippi
execution.preview/index.html
executions next week, moving quickly after the Supreme Court ruled
April 16 that Kentucky's lethal injection procedures were
constitutional."); Bill Mears, Georgia Killer Executed After Lethal
Injection Moratorium,CNN, May 6, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
CRIME/05/06/georgia.execution/index.html ("William Earl Lynd was
the first inmate to die by injection since September, when the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the three-drug combination
represented cruel and unusual punishment.").
97 See generally Associated Press, Ohio Performs 1,000 Execution in
U.S., FOX NEWS, July 21, 2009, http://foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,534254,00.html (reporting the 1000th execution in the United
States since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976); The Clark
County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, U.S. Executions since 1976,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm (last visited
July 20, 2009) (providing a chronologically organized chart with the
names of convicts executed since 1976 and by what method the
executions were carried out).
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most of the states that employ lethal injection as the method
of execution follow the three-drug protocol addressed in
Baze.98 The Court specifically commented on its probable
treatment of future challenges to methods that mirror
Kentucky's protocol: "A State with a lethal injection
protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold
today would not create a risk that meets this standard." 99
"This standard" refers to what a convict must prove to
successfully show that a lethal injection protocol violates
that the method "creates a
the Eighth Amendment:
demonstrated risk of severe pain. He must show that the
compared to the known and
risk is substantial when
00
alternatives."'
available
The most recent decision that applied Baze came
from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 2, 2009, in
Harbison v. Little. l0 ' Harbison, a death row inmate, argued
that "the lethal injection protocol utilized by [Tennessee]
violates his Eighth Amendment rights because it involves
02
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."'
However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument because
Tennessee, like Kentucky, employs a three-drug protocol
for carrying out lethal injection. 0 3 As a result, the court
held:
Given the direction in Baze that a protocol
substantially similar to Kentucky's would not
98 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527 (2008) (noting that "at least 30

[States] (including Kentucky) use the same combinations of three drugs
in their lethal injection protocols") (citation omitted).
99 Id. at 1537 (emphasis added).
1ooId.
'01 Harbison v. Little, No 07-6225, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14742, at

*1 (6th Cir. July 2, 2009).
102 Id. at *3.
103

Id. at *4 ("The three drugs utilized are sodium thiopental,

pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.") (citation omitted).
Kentucky uses the same three drugs.

22

6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 283

create a risk that violates the constitutional
standard set forth in the Court's opinion,
Tennessee's protocol must be upheld because
Baze addressed the same risks identified by the
trial court, but reached the conclusion that they did
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 104
The Sixth Circuit's actions demonstrate the policy impact
of Baze. Like many other states that halted and examined
lethal injection protocols while Baze was pending,
Tennessee ultimately retained its three-drug protocol
because the method did not violate the Eighth Amendment
ban on "cruel and unusual punishments."' 0 5 As this recent
action demonstrated, the lower courts have employed Baze
to uphold the lethal injection protocols used by the states,
building on the foundation of policy that has historically
recognized the states' abilities to choose a specific
procedure for carrying out death sentences.
V.

10 6
Analysis and Evaluation

The Court in Baze correctly held that the lethal
injection method of execution did not violate the Eighth
However, the substantial risk standard
Amendment.
the
plurality significantly broadened the
approved by
original intent of cruel and unusual punishments because no
substantial risk standard is stated within the text of the
Constitution nor has one been previously contemplated by
1' Id. at *I1-12. The court referred to the Supreme Court's statement
in Baze: "A State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar
to the protocol we upheld today would not create a risk that meets this
standard." Id. at *8-9 (citation omitted).
'0'See id. at *5

Before proceeding to the Analysis Section, I want to state that the
analysis is based upon my research and understanding on the topic as a
first-year law student. The conclusions stated in this section reflect my
opinion.
'06
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the Court. As a result, the addition of a substantial risk
assessment (requiring the petitioner to prove that "the
State's lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk
of severe pain [and] .. .that the risk is substantial when
compared to the known and available alternative") 10 7 only
complicates the purpose and intention of the Eighth
Amendment and adds an unnecessary and arbitrary element
of analysis. Further, the establishment of a substantial risk
standard departs from the holdings of previous cases that
sustained other methods of execution. 10 8 Those holdings
were direct and to the point, concisely explaining the
purpose of the Eight Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishments. 0 9 In summary, the basic purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is simple and was accurately and
succinctly stated by Justice Thomas in his concurring
opinion: "[A] method of execution violates the Eighth
Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict
pain."' 10
As an example of this simple purpose, in Wilkerson,
the Court rejected the argument that death by firing squad
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
protection from cruelty because it did not fall into the
category of punishment in which pain and suffering were
"superadded" to the execution. 1
Similarly, the Court
explained in Kemmler that the meaning of "cruel," as used
to punishment
in the Eighth Amendment, referred
2
1
death.""
lingering
or
involving "torture
In both of these precedent-setting cases, the Court
relied on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process to declare
the methods of execution constitutional and consistently
107

Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537 (2008).

108See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.

109See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
110 Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
' Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
..
112 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
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understood the Eighth Amendment as "forbidding
Interestingly, the
purposely tortuous punishments.""11 3
plurality opinion in Baze briefly cited those important cases
in the context of its discussions of the purpose of the Eighth
Amendment: the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments intended to guard against the infliction of
additional pain. The plurality, however, did not actually
incorporate the Court's previous holdings and instead left
the discussion as an isolated historical overview on the
subject. 114 Had the Court truly used the cases for its
examinations of the Eighth Amendment, the Court would
have realized that the establishment of a substantial risk
assessment scheme could not be reconciled with the
15
analysis in these long-revered and respected cases.'
Therefore, just as Justice Thomas reasoned in his
concurrence, the substantial risk standard has no basis in
the historical understanding of the Eighth Amendment or in
the applicable method-of-execution cases previously
discussed.1 16
The Eighth Amendment originated from a similar
provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1688,' 17 and its
subsequent history can be succinctly described as follows:
The path by which the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments" has come into our law is well
known. It first appeared in the English Bill of
"

Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1560 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

114See Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1530.
115

37.
116

See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 436, 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S at 130, 136Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556 ("This standard.., finds no support in the

original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or
in previous method-of-execution cases. .. ").
117 Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463. See generally William H. Danne, Jr.,
Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111, 130-34 (1973) (reviewing the history of

"cruel and unusual punishments").

25

6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 286

Rights of 1688. It formed a part of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776. James
the constitutional
it in
placed
Madison
1789 and it was
in
drafted
amendments he
approved by Congress with little debate. It was
incorporated into the Constitution in 1791 as part
of the eighth amendment." 18

Although there appeared to be little debate on the
amendment, the Framers of the Constitution intended to use
the Eighth Amendment to limit legislative bodies from
imposing torturous punishments.1 9 "Like other parts of the
Bill of Rights, this amendment was intended to allay the
doubts of those who feared that the new federal
government, unchecked by specific constitutional
limitations, might ride roughshod over personal
liberties."' 120 Therefore, the inclusion of the amendment in
I18

Joseph E. Browdy & Robert J. Saltzman, Note, The Effectiveness of

the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
119Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1557-58 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120Browdy, supra note I 1, at 846 (footnote omitted); see also James
S. Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of
Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV.
996 (1964).
That the eighth amendment prohibits, at a minimum,
the infliction of "inhuman and barbarous"
punishments is clear from the few clues we now have
about the purpose of including it in the Bill of Rights
.... At the Massachusetts convention Mr. Holmes
pointed out that under the Constitution the Congress
was "nowhere restrained from inventing the most
cruel and unheard-of punishments and annexing them
to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on
them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the
most mild instruments of discipline."
Id. at 997 (footnotes omitted).
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the Constitution had the specific purpose of curtailing the
torturous and barbarous punishments that were inflicted
upon the people by English monarchs. 12'
Accordingly, "[e]xpressions in the first congress
confirm the view that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause was directed at prohibiting certain methods of
punishment."'' 22 These were to be prohibited because they
were unquestionably torturous and clearly meant to inflict
unnecessary pain and suffering.
No risk assessment
scheme was contemplated as a necessary part of the
analysis because the prohibition of cruel and unusual
of
punishments was simply implemented by the Framers
123
excessive."
is
which
"that
prohibit
to
the Constitution
Returning to the plurality's opinion in Baze, the
cases that the plurality cited in support of its substantial risk
standard do not address the constitutionality of the
execution methods; rather, the cases discuss the Eighth
Amendment in relation to the risk of injury to an inmate
while imprisoned. 124 Although such situations warrant the
application of the Eighth Amendment, the deprivation of
water or food differs significantly from the slight prick of a
sterile needle during the administration of lethal injection.
The plurality made no attempt at distinguishing the two
situations, but instead simply stated that "[o]ur cases
recognize that subjecting individuals to a risk of future
harm-not simply actually inflicting pain-can qualify as
cruel and unusual punishment."' 12 5 In neglecting to
distinguish the situations, the plurality delivered a decision
121 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840-41
(1969).
122 Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
123 Id. (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
124 See e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
125Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530.
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with an unsupported and unjustified substantial risk
standard because the cases used to support the standard do
not coincide with the situation in which the standard will
actually be applied (during the implementation of the death
In essence, the Court compared apples to
penalty).
oranges. Because the plurality then proceeded to establish
a standard based on these incompatible scenarios, the
substantial risk standard is neither correct nor appropriate.
To further show how the plurality supported the
substantial risk standard, consider the main case cited:
Helling v. McKinney. 126 The case concerned an inmate's
exposure to tobacco smoke and the potential health risk
caused to the inmate by such exposure.' 27 The Court held
that a claim for relief for this health risk could be sought
under the Eighth Amendment.' 28 However, to apply the
concept of substantial risk to the instant matter, the Court
banked on the statement in Helling statement that a risk
must be "sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering."' 129 The standard, as applied to the
prison condition situation in Helling, adequately resolved
the issue. When applied to the method-of-execution
context, however, the holding expands the original intent of
the Eighth Amendment. It does so because it requires the
courts to assess the execution methods of states for any
potential risk of harm.
The difficulty with using Helling is that the case
made reference to a condition of confinement, not to the
126

Helling, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).

127

Id. at 27-28.

128 Id.

at 35 ("We affirm the Court of Appeals that McKinney states a

cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that
petitioners have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of
ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future
health.").
129 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531

(quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 33)

(emphasis in original).
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punishment of confinement itself. 130 This is problematic
when one recalls that the Eighth Amendment bans cruel
3
and unusual punishments, not conditions of punishments.' '
"At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word
'punishment' referred to the penalty imposed for the
commission of a crime."' 132 "Punishments" include fines,
penalties, confinement, and sentences imposed. 133 No
historical evidence indicates that the Framers of the
Constitution intended to consider anything other than
purposes. 134
Amendment
Eighth
for
punishments
Therefore, no evidence proves that the Framers considered
conditions as a possible subject of cruel and unusual
135
punishments.
In this context, the Court's application of such a
standard is troublesome, especially considering that the
instant matter involved a method of execution, not a
condition of confinement or even confinement itself. In
essence, the Court disregarded the simple intent of the
Eighth Amendment, as alluded to in the prior method-ofexecution cases: "[T]he Eighth Amendment is aimed 3at
6
methods of execution purposely designed to inflict pain."
Further, because of the plurality's opinion, two
conflicting standards to assess the constitutionality of
1) An
methods of execution now arguably exist:
assessment of whether punishments clearly involve a
purposeful infliction of pain or "something more than the

"0

Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations

omitted).
131Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Id. at 38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
133 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990)).
134See id. at 38-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
135 Helling, 509 U.S. at 38-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
136 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1559 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
132
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mere extinguishment of life"'137 as described in historical
case law and 2) the "substantial risk" assessment as stated
in Baze. The task of assessing whether a method purposely
inflicts pain is completely different from determining
whether a method of execution "creates a substantial risk of
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture, or
lingering death"' 13 8 or provides "a 'substantial risk 1of
39
serious harm,' an 'objectively intolerable risk of harm."",
This second method only serves to confuse and complicate
an assessment that was intended by the Framers of the
Constitution to be simple.
Further, an assessment of a "substantial risk" of
harm is far from an objective standard because one
person's definitions of both "substantial" and "risk" will
almost always differ from the next person's definition. On
the other hand, a determination of whether a method of
execution purposefully inflicts unnecessary and excessive
pain is much more black and white. In fact, it could be
argued that lethal injection itself was designed for the very
reason of ensuring that the convicted felon would not feel
any pain during the execution process, thereby eliminating
the argument that any purposeful or unnecessary pain is
inflicted.
Finally on this point, the plurality in Baze admitted
that some levels of pain are inherent with various execution
The plurality also said that this inherent
methods. 14
possibility (a "risk" of pain) is not grounds for qualifying

In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006) (emphasis added).
139 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
140
id. at 1529 ("Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of
execution-no matter how humane-if only from the prospect of error
in following the required procedure. It is clear, then, that the
Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in
carrying out executions.")
137
138
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an execution method as cruel and unusual. 141 Therefore,
that very admission by the plurality severely complicates, if
not completely contradicts, its substantial risk assessment
scheme.
Additionally, the plurality opinion in Baze may only
exacerbate the lethal injection debate as it will most likely
give rise to yet more litigation on the subject.142 The
opinion inadvertently opens the door for frivolous claims
from convicts for the possible causes of substantial risk,
including human error, lingering death, and the actual act
of administering lethal injection. In essence, the creation of
a substantial risk standard complicated the much simpler
standard established by previous cases and litigation will
quickly ensue to take advantage of the expanded standard.
The substantial risk standard unwarrantedly confuses the
is
original purpose of the Eighth Amendment, which 143
excessive.
clearly
are
that
punishments
prohibit
simply to
Further, the Baze plurality gave no definition of
"substantial," nor did the plurality give any instruction on
As a result, if the
how to address such inquiries.'
standard is followed, the lower courts will have to establish
their own definitions for the substantial risk standard,
actions which will undoubtedly be challenged by yet more
litigation.
141 Id. at 1531 ("Simply because an execution method may result in
pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does
not establish the sort of 'objectively intolerable risk of harm' that
qualifies as cruel and unusual.").
142 See id. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring).
143 Granucci, supra note 121, at 842 (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144

U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).
144 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1994) (referring to Helling's
holding regarding the risk of injury, this subsequent case said that "[a]t
what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for
Eighth Amendment purposes is a question this case does not present,
and we do not address it").
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Consequently, rather than following the precedents
set out in Wilkerson and Kemmler, the Court stretched an
obscure, risk-based standard and forced it to fit the methodof-execution issue in Baze. The plurality almost seemed to
intentionally avoid writing a simple opinion that would
express the true, concise, and historically established
standard of analysis used to determine whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual. That standard simply
prohibits the purposeful infliction of pain. As a result, the
plurality's substantial risk standard does nothing more than
open the door to future litigation on methods of execution
and the implementation of the death penalty in general,
"encumber[ing] [the death penalty] with unwarranted
restrictions neither contained in the text of the Constitution
' 14 5
nor reflected in two centuries of practice under it."
Conclusion

VI.

Baze correctly held that Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The
plurality's implementation of a substantial risk standard for
measuring a violation of the Eighth Amendment, however,
severely complicates the Eighth Amendment's intent 1to
46
prohibit torture and "inhuman and barbarous"'
punishments that involve "something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.' 47 Although the plurality opinion
in Baze is not authoritative and did not infringe on the
states' abilities to choose a specific procedure for
administering a method of execution, the opinion will
undoubtedly affect the method of execution policy
decisions of the states.
Thus, the substantial risk standard adds unnecessary
elements to the analysis of the constitutionality of a method
128 S. Ct. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.

145 Baze,
146

147 id.
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of execution, requiring the courts to assess any proffered
alternative procedure and further justify the reasons for
adhering to any current method of execution.1 48 The Baze
plurality effectively diluted the standard of cruel and
unusual punishments as intended by Framers of the
Constitution, stated in the text of the Eighth Amendment
and supported by the Court's previous decisions in methodSimply, punishments must be
of-execution cases.
intentionally designed to inflict pain worse than death itself
in order to violate the Eighth Amendment. In consideration
of this straightforward purpose, a more complicated
standard only misinterprets the Framers' original intention
for the amendment, opening the door to a never-ending
influx of unnecessary and costly litigation.

148

See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
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